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UNPATRIOTIC ACTS: AN INTRODUCTION
SADIQ REZA*
John Walker Lindh.  Zacarias Moussaoui.  Jose Padilla.  Rich-
ard Reid.  Who reading these lines does not instantly recognize the
names of these men?  Or at least their assigned noms de guerre:
American Taliban, 20th hijacker, dirty bomber, shoe bomber.  For
two and a half years these names and others have flitted through
our daily copies of The New York Times like shadow characters in a
play, along with black-and-white photographs underneath which
black-and-white text tells us of their alleged (and sometimes
proven) wrongdoing and the latest developments in their tribula-
tions (and sometimes trials) with our government.  But the men
themselves are almost invisible, hidden from us by our government,
which insists that the characters and the play are too dangerous for
public view.
The cliché that the events of September 11, 2001, “changed
everything” is perhaps nowhere more true than in the realm of
criminal procedure.  Soon the Supreme Court will decide whether
aliens the United States has imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
can challenge their detention in U.S. courts, and whether a U.S.
citizen captured in a foreign war zone can be held indefinitely,
without counsel or even a charge, when the president decides he is
an “enemy combatant.”1  The Court will also decide whether a U.S.
citizen arrested inside the U.S. and deemed an enemy combatant
can be similarly detained;2 and the Court may decide whether the
government can continue to detain individuals under the federal
* Associate Professor, New York Law School.  My thanks to Gene Cerruti, Steve
Ellmann, Tanina Rostain, and Don Zeigler for comments; second-year student
Courtney Fennimore, for quick and very capable assistance with citations; and the Na-
tional Association of Muslim Lawyers (NAML), for initially gathering attorneys who re-
present terror accusees, including some of the authors in this Symposium issue, on a
panel at its Third Annual Conference at Columbia Law School in October 2002.
1. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 72
U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 03-343); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335
(4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3446 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004)(No. 03-6696).
2. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W.
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4 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
material-witness statute in order to obtain grand jury testimony
from them.3  Meanwhile, the American Civil Liberties Union is
challenging the government’s authority to search homes without
probable cause and to order libraries and other organizations to
disclose information about private citizens, both in secret;4 the
Fourth Circuit is deciding whether a terror defendant can have ac-
cess to other alleged terrorists in government custody who a trial
court has decided might provide evidence exculpating the defen-
dant;5 and U.S. military tribunals will soon begin trying Guanta-
namo Bay detainees in proceedings shorn of constitutional
protections long embraced as essential to due process.6  Each of
these matters involves a criminal procedure issue that is central to
the government’s post-September 11 domestic antiterrorism efforts.
Few of us, if any, imagined that any of these issues would ever arise.
This is not to say we were not warned that terrorism might alter
the criminal procedure equation — that ever-shifting and never
fully satisfying balance of civil liberty and individualized justice on
the one hand, and effective and efficient criminal law enforcement
on the other.  The Supreme Court itself has suggested that constitu-
tional rules of procedure might differ in terror cases, and our law
and history abound with examples of constitutional “exceptions” in
the face of perceived threats to national security.7  We thus await
3. United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that material-
witness statute permits detention for grand jury testimony), petition for rehearing filed
January 20, 2004.
4. Muslim Community Ass’n. v. Ashcroft, No. 03-72913 (E.D. Mich. filed July 30,
2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=13248&c=
206; USA PATRIOT Act § 215, 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (West 2003).
5. See United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480 (E.D. Va. 2003) (barring
death penalty and forbidding prosecutors to introduce evidence that defendant ac-
cused in September 11 attacks had knowledge of or involvement in those attacks, as
sanctions for government’s refusal to produce potentially exculpatory witnesses in U.S.
custody), appeal docketed, No. 03-4792 (4th Cir. Oct. 7, 2003).
6. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Charges Two at Guantanamo with Conspiracy, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at A1; Neil A. Lewis, Bush’s Power To Plan Trial Of Detainees Is
Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at A16 (discussing Supreme Court brief filed by five
military defense lawyers challenging president’s constitutional authority to try detainees
in military tribunals); Neal Katyal & Laurence Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying
the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002).
7. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (“the Fourth
Amendment would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up
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2003] INTRODUCTION 5
today’s pending decisions with bated breath, half of us hoping and
the other half fearing such exceptions will become the rule.
But many men and women have done more than simply wait;
instead they have joined the battle, defending alleged terrorists
against government prosecutions and practices that many feel pose
as much of a threat to democracy as the terrorists themselves.  In
this special issue of the New York Law School Law Review, some of
these advocates share their stories with us, presenting the facts and
the law of cases they have worked on along with lessons they have
learned in the process.  Accompanying the insight of these practi-
tioner-scholars is analysis from full-time legal scholars who grapple
with the same issues of criminal procedure, substantive criminal
law, and professional ethics that practitioners face in these cases.
And valuable wisdom from abroad is here too, in a unique contribu-
tion from public defenders in Israel, a country that has a bit more
experience with terror prosecutions than we do.  I hope you find
the articles in this issue an invaluable resource, a primer if you will,
for practitioners and scholars interested in the rights of individuals
accused of terrorism.8
The Symposium begins with Robert Boyle’s discussion of the
case of his client Osama Awadallah, a Palestinian-Jordanian student
from San Diego whose telephone number appeared on a scrap of
paper found in the belongings of one of the alleged September 11
hijackers.  Mr. Boyle describes Mr. Awadallah’s seizure, interroga-
tion, and arrest as an alleged material witness, his treatment while
detained, and his ultimate indictment for perjury — on startlingly
weak grounds — after he testified before a grand jury pursuant to a
government summons.  Mr. Boyle also presents his argument that
the federal material-witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144, does not au-
thorize the detention of prospective grand jury witnesses.  A federal
block the primary purpose of which was crime control); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266,
274 (2000) (“We do not say . . . that a report of a person carrying a bomb need bear
indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person carrying a firearm before the
police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.”) (holding Fourth Amendment violated
when police frisk suspect upon no more than anonymous tip of gun possession); DAVID
COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 88-179 (2003).
8. It is a matter of public record that I have met with Zacarias Moussaoui as a
legal adviser in connection with the charges he faces related to the September 11 at-
tacks.  My role in this Symposium, however, is only to introduce the articles and some of
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6 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
trial judge in New York ruled that the material-witness statute was
indeed misused in Mr. Awadallah’s case and dismissed his indict-
ment, but a second federal trial judge in New York in another case
decided the statute did apply to grand jury witnesses; the Second
Circuit agreed with the latter decision and ordered Mr. Awadallah’s
indictment reinstated.9  Mr. Boyle’s argument is now before the
Second Circuit in a petition for rehearing en banc.  However the
statutory issue is ultimately resolved, Mr. Boyle’s account raises sep-
arate questions about the propriety of the government’s treatment
and indictment of Mr. Awadallah.
The Symposium next presents edited portions of briefs written
by Donna Newman on behalf of her client, José Padilla.  Ms. New-
man chronicles Mr. Padilla’s May 2002 arrest and detention by the
Department of Justice as an alleged material witness (to what, the
DOJ has not publicly disclosed), President George W. Bush’s desig-
nation of him as an enemy combatant, Mr. Padilla’s transfer to the
custody of the Department of Defense, and Mr. Padilla’s subse-
quent imprisonment — approaching two years — without a crimi-
nal charge or access to counsel.  Ms. Newman also presents the
legal arguments against this unprecedented treatment of an Ameri-
can citizen — arguments that have already prevailed before the Sec-
ond Circuit, which found Mr. Padilla’s detention unlawful and
ordered his release from military custody.  The Supreme Court is
scheduled to hear the government’s appeal of that ruling the same
day it considers the case of Yaser Hamdi, the other U.S. citizen-cum-
enemy combatant whose incommunicado detention the Court is re-
viewing.10  Meanwhile, after barring all access to Mr. Padilla since
the time he was designated an enemy combatant, the government
has now allowed Ms. Newman to meet with him, although it still
maintains that Mr. Padilla’s access to counsel is a matter of execu-
tive discretion.11  While we await the Supreme Court’s decision, we
9. United States v. Awadallah, 202 F.Supp. 2d  55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (Scheindlin,
J.); In re Material Witness Warrant, 213 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)(Mukasey, J.);
United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2nd Cir. 2003), petition for rehearing filed
January 20, 2004.
10. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2nd Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W.
3486 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2004)(No.03-1027); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335 (4th Cir.
2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3446 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004)(No. 03-6696).
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2003] INTRODUCTION 7
have Ms. Newman’s winning arguments to digest.  And we may be
especially proud that Ms. Newman is a graduate of New York Law
School.
The next article is written by Sam Schmidt and Josh Dratel, a
pair of seasoned terror-defense lawyers who represented Wadih El-
Hage in the pre-September 11 trial in the Southern District of New
York relating to the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in
Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.  That trial ended in
the conviction of Mr. El-Hage and his three co-defendants, but not
before our attorney-authors were able to turn some of the govern-
ment’s special terror-prosecution practices to their client’s advan-
tage.  These practices are now de rigueur in terror cases: “Special
Administrative Measures” that impose onerous conditions of con-
finement on defendants and severely restrict their access to counsel
and to the outside world; protective orders that allow the govern-
ment to designate discovery material “particularly sensitive,” which
prevents counsel from sharing that material with anyone not
“cleared” by the government; and the designation of wide swaths of
relevant information, including impeachment material and other
potentially exculpatory information, as “classified,” thus preventing
even the client from seeing it.  All of these practices of course make
defending terror accusees monumentally more difficult than repre-
senting the everyday criminal defendant, to say nothing of the
novel and serious constitutional questions they raise.12  Messrs.
Schmidt and Dratel describe how, through ingenuity and persis-
12. See, e.g., Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 482 (Sixth Amendment requires de-
fense access to potentially exculpatory witnesses in government custody despite govern-
ment’s asserted national security concerns); Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s
Motion for Relief from Conditions of Confinement at 9, Moussaoui (No. 01-455-A) (ar-
guing special administrative measures violate due process right to participate in defense
and Sixth Amendment right to counsel), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.
gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/64929/0.pdf; Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s
Motion for Access to Classified and Sensitive Discovery and for Relief from Special Ad-
ministrative Measures Concerning Confinement at 11, Moussaoui (No. 01-455-A) (chal-
lenging withholding of material designated classified or sensitive from pro se defendant
on Fifth and Sixth Amendment grounds), available at http://notablecases.vaed.us
courts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/65801/0.pdf; but see United States v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d
74, 81-82 (2d Cir. 2000) (rejecting due process challenge to special administrative mea-
sures); United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7)98 CR. 1023 LBS, 2001 WL 66393 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 25, 2001) (rejecting Fifth and Sixth Amendment challenges to allowing counsel
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8 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
tence, they nonetheless managed to turn these restrictions in part
to their client’s benefit.
Next, Kenneth Mann and David Weiner provide an illuminat-
ing account of the Israeli public defender system — and in the pro-
cess they show that we have much to learn from Israel about
defending terror accusees.  The authors describe how the right to
appointed defense counsel has evolved in Israel, culminating in the
1996 establishment of the Office of the Public Defender (OPD), in
which they both proudly worked.  They also demonstrate the ex-
traordinary pains attorneys in that office take to establish trust with
Palestinian clients and vigorously defend them — including those
charged with terrorist crimes resulting in the death of scores of Is-
raeli civilians — in the very best traditions of zealous advocacy and
client-centered representation.  Professors Mann and Weiner do
identify shortcomings in the defense of those charged not in
Israel’s civilian courts but in its military courts, to which OPD juris-
diction does not extend, and it is not clear whether those courts
accord defendants more or less procedural protection than the U.S.
military tribunals that are soon to commence.  But their story of
how the OPD defended Marwan Barghouti, the alleged terrorist
leader tried in Israeli civilian court in 2002 for a series of terrorist
murders and conspiracies going back some two and a half years, is a
tale of inspired defense lawyering, sophisticated understanding of a
client’s objectives, and fierce devotion to the principle of client au-
tonomy.  It should be required reading for every lawyer who repre-
sents a terror defendant in the U.S.
The Symposium next presents an article by Professor Ran-
dolph Jonakait concerning the hotly-debated pre-September 11 law
that forbids providing “material support” or resources to desig-
nated “foreign terrorist organizations.”13  The Ninth Circuit has
twice declared parts of this law unconstitutionally vague, and has
added that a conviction under the statute requires proof the defen-
dant knew of the organization’s terrorist activities.14  Professor
13. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (West 2000 & Supp. 2003).
14. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that terms “personnel” and “training” as forms of forbidden material support are void
for vagueness); Humanitarian Law Project v. DOJ, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003) (same,
and to satisfy due process conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
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2003] INTRODUCTION 9
Jonakait identifies yet a third possible constitutional infirmity.  In
2001, the D.C. Circuit ruled that due process is violated when the
government designates — without notice or an opportunity to be
heard, as the statute allows — a group that has sufficient presence
in the U.S. as a qualifying terrorist organization.  Building on this
ruling, Professor Jonakait argues that due process is again violated
when the government prosecutes a person for providing material
support to a group so designated because the statute creates an ir-
rebuttable presumption the group is a qualifying terrorist organiza-
tion.  As a remedy, Professor Jonakait urges amending the statute to
require constitutionally sufficient notice to any organization whose
designation is imminent, or at least allowing individuals charged
under the statute to challenge the designation.
Next, Professor Cameron Stracher writes about the govern-
ment’s efforts to shroud significant portions of its terrorist prosecu-
tions in secrecy.  Professor Stracher addresses the issue through the
case of Zacarias Moussaoui, the only person in the U.S. who faces
charges related to the September 11 attacks.  In Mr. Moussaoui’s
case, the district court had routinely sealed pleadings and orders at
the government’s request until Professor Stracher and his col-
leagues, representing several news media intervenors, convinced
the court that the First Amendment compelled public access to vir-
tually all documents not marked “classified.”  Similarly, Professor
Stracher and his colleagues convinced the Fourth Circuit to open
the filings and arguments in the government’s appeal of the district
court’s order directing the government to produce detained wit-
nesses — one of whom is widely reported to be Ramzi bin al-Shibh,
named in Mr. Moussaoui’s indictment as a co-conspirator — to de-
termine whether their testimony might exculpate Mr. Moussaoui.15
of organization’s unlawful activities that caused designation); see also Humanitarian Law
Project v. Ashcroft, No. CV03-6107 ABC., 2004 WL 112760 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding in
part that language “expert advice or assistance,” added to definition of forbidden mate-
rial support by provision of USA PATRIOT Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, is impermissibly
vague).
15. The Fourth Circuit ruled that only those portions of pleadings and arguments
specifically designated as “classified” could remain sealed.  United States v. Moussaoui,
333 F.3d 509, 513 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Tom Jackman, Moussaoui Asks to Call Three
More al Qaeda Witnesses, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2003, at A18 (“Sources close to the case
have said that U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema has granted the defense access to
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10 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
These efforts, which Professor Stracher describes here, have effec-
tively thwarted the government’s attempt to prevent public knowl-
edge of much of Mr. Moussaoui’s case with indiscriminate
invocations of national security concerns.  We now await a Fourth
Circuit ruling on the merits of the witness issue, much better in-
formed thanks to Professor Stracher.16
Finally, two scholars square off over an issue that must lie at the
outer boundary of permissible antiterrorism practices: the use of
torture to interrogate suspected terrorists.  Professor Marcy Strauss
presents the various definitions of torture and the provisions of do-
mestic and international law that ostensibly forbid it.  She shows
how interrogation methods that qualify as torture might find
breathing room in the space between the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against compulsory self-incrimination and the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, particularly if the
goal is to prevent imminent catastrophic harm (the “ticking bomb”
scenario) and the information obtained is not used in a criminal
trial.  Nevertheless, Professor Strauss concludes, torture should be
forbidden on constitutional or policy grounds because it is im-
moral, ineffective, and difficult to limit in any principled way.  In
response, Professor Alan Dershowitz focuses not on whether or not
torture should be employed, but rather, given its widely-reported
post-September 11 use by the U.S. and its likely future use in a tick-
ing-bomb scenario, his preference that it be regulated by warrant.
Professor Dershowitz shows how a warrant requirement could re-
duce the use and the severity of torture; he answers those who
would permit torture only when it is done “off the books” by
stressing the virtues of judicial control and public accountability.
record, because Brinkema has sealed most of the proceedings, citing national security
concerns.”); see also Philip Shenon, Judge Grants the Government A Delay of Moussaoui’s
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.13, 2003, at A21 (“the Justice Department [. . .] is appealing a
ruling by Judge Brinkema that would allow Mr. Moussaoui’s court-appointed lawyers to
question Ramzi bin al-Shibh, another admitted Qaeda member who was captured in
Pakistan last October, people with access to court information said.”).
16. It bears noting that the government’s refusal to make detainee Ramzi bin al-
Shibh available has now reportedly derailed two German prosecutions related to the
September 11 attacks, including the sole conviction in the world in those attacks. See
Desmond Butler, German Judges Order a Retrial for a 9/11 Figure, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2004,
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2003] INTRODUCTION 11
There are, of course, many more issues of criminal procedure
raised by the government’s terror prosecutions than those dis-
cussed in this volume.  There are also many other practitioners rep-
resenting terror accusees today with courage, creativity, and
commitment to the constitutional rights of even these most vilified
of defendants and detainees.  (No U.S. case other than that of
Zacarias Moussaoui, incidentally, involves terrorism charges arising
out of the September 11 attacks — and even that case may no
longer.)17  No one can fault the government for moving aggres-
sively to protect national security and for using the criminal process
to do so.  We can and should, however, take the government to task
for misusing the criminal process, for violating clear mandates and
cherished principles of that process, and for attempting to evade
judicial review and public accountability in its terror prosecutions.
For our enemies to be anti-American is understandable; that is what
makes them our enemies.  For American attorneys to defend these
alleged enemies, and for lawyers, legal scholars, and others to hold
the government to core constitutional principles in pursuing them,
is quintessentially American.  But for our government to employ
un-American methods in pursuing these enemies is unacceptable.
It is, in fact, unpatriotic.
17. The trial court has forbidden the government to introduce any evidence of
Mr. Moussaoui’s alleged involvement in the September 11 plot as one sanction for the
government’s refusal to produce the potentially exculpatory detainee-witnesses.  United
States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 487 (E.D. Va. 2003).  The government has,
moreover, long since given up its theory that Mr. Moussaoui was the “20th hijacker,”
naming, instead, first Ramzi bin al-Shibh and more recently a different individual as
that hijacker. See Philip Shenon, Man Held in U.S. Was Wired 2 Large Sums From Germany,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2001, at B8; New Theory on a 20th Hijacker Is Offered, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
16, 2001, at B10; James Risen, U.S. Says Suspect Tied to 9/11 And Qaeda Is Captured in
Raid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2002, at A1; Philip Shenon, Panel Says a Deported Saudi Was
Likely “20th Hijacker,” N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2004, at A16 (quoting member of indepen-
dent commission on September 11 attacks as saying “[i]t’s extremely possible if not
probable that Mohamed al-Kahtani was to be the 20th hijacker”); see also Jonathan
Turley, Commentary, The Growing Collection of “20th Hijackers,” L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2003, at
B17 (“When the case against Moussaoui began falling apart under a mountain of con-
tradictory evidence, the government announced that it had captured Bin al-Shibh –
who was then labeled the 20th hijacker.”).
